Criticism of Heretics’ Views of Nirvāṇa in the 70th Paragraph of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra:Sumiwake as Buddhist Wisdom for Multicultural Harmonious Co-existence by Horiuchi Toshio
Criticism of Heretics’ Views of Nirva?a in
the 70th Paragraph of the
La?kavatarasutra:Sumiwake as Buddhist Wisdom
for Multicultural Harmonious Co-existence
著者 Horiuchi Toshio
journal or
publication title
Journal of International Philosophy
number 4
page range 331-340
year 2015-03-31
URL http://id.nii.ac.jp/1060/00008214/
Creative Commons : 表示 - 非営利 - 改変禁止
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ja
331Journal of International Philosophy, No.4 2015
Criticism of Heretics’ Views of Nirvāṇa in the 70th 
Paragraph of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra:
Sumiwake as Buddhist Wisdom for Multicultural Harmonious
 Co-existence 
HoriuCHi Toshio
introduction
The Laṅkāvatārasūtra’s 70th paragraph1 lists and criticizes heretics’ views of nirvāṇa. Nakamura [1950] and 
Takasaki [1985] have done partial research on this section, and Japanese translations of it have been published.2 In 
this paper, I will uncover wisdom regarding multicultural harmonious co-existence that takes the form of sumiwake 
棲み分け (habitat segregation/ lifestyle partitioning), which can be seen from as far back as early Buddhism in this 
paragraph.3 Furthermore, I will offer a Japanese translation of this paragraph (excluding repetitive verses) as 
reference material. The only critical edition of the sutra based on manuscripts and covering its entirety is Nanjo 
[1923] (below, Nj). Various issues regarding this text perhaps unavoidable due to the constraints of its time and it 
being the first attempt of its kind have been pointed out and scholars have asserted the need for a completely revised 
critical edition. Nj is a critical edition based on four manuscripts he was able to obtain. Subsequently many other 
manuscripts were discovered. Takasaki created a reliable revised critical edition of a certain chapter in the sutra 
based on 16 manuscripts (Takasaki [1981]). However, the problem with Nj is not that it is based on a limited number 
of manuscripts; rather, it lies in its inaccurate readings of them (again, understandable due to the constraints of his 
time). Incidentally, all but one of the sutra’s manuscripts are on paper. The single other manuscript is written on palm 
leaves (T MS), and it sometimes presents better readings of the sutra than the others. Thus, one of my endeavors in 
this paper will be to present the readings of this palm leaf manuscript when translating some sections. This paper 
covers a section that occupies less than four pages in Nj. However, Nj fails to include footnotes on the variant 
readings found in the T MS in five places within this section. Among these sections, three readings will enable us to 
understand the sentences that were unclear in previous studies that were based on only Nj.
1) The 70th Paragraph of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra
This paragraph introduces 22 heretical views of nirvāṇa / mokṣa (liberation) which I will number from (1) to (22). 
(For details, please consult the attached reference material.) For example, it presents the theory that one reaches 
nirvāṇa by understanding that Time or an independent God is the creator of the world (11, 18). As Takasaki [2009: 
427] accurately points out, this understanding connects to a theory of liberation because, “In terms of content these 
are theories of the formation of the world rather than nirvāṇa (liberation). (However, in that one is liberated by 
correctly seeing this, they are all theories of liberation.)” Here, in the background is the attitude that has existed since 
early Buddhism, namely, that wisdom that awakens oneself to the way things are as they are (yathābhūta) is 
enlightenment.
 The sutra first presents the following view of nirvāṇa of “certain heretics”:
Articles
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 (1) There occurs no bundle of mind and mind associates through seeing that [everything] differs from 
permanence (i.e., is impermanent), through the aversion to the objects, through the destruction of skandha ([five] 
aggregates), dhātu ([eighteen] cognitive elements), and āyatana ([twelve] sense fields).
In his commentary, Jñānaśrībhadra states, “Śrāvaka and those called “dge slong skye bo’i chos bsam pa can” see the 
[five] aggregates as extinguishing. On the other hand, in the Mahāyāna, they are neither permanent nor nonexistent 
since the subject and object do not exist because objects of the external world do not exist.” Jñānagarbha also holds 
that this understanding of nirvāṇa is not one of heretics, but rather śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. This understanding 
simply says that false discrimination (vikalpa) does not arise when its cause goes away (subsequently described as 
“material causes halting”). The sutra criticizes it on the grounds that false discrimination does not arise “by 
understanding that objects to be examined are empty.”
 Below appears the understanding that one enters nirvāṇa by understanding sva-lakṣaṇa (own characteristics) 
and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (general characteristics).
 (6) Further, others (heretics) imagine nirvāṇa by the realization of its own, and the general characteristics of all 
things, by the [real] existence of things of the past, future, and present as un-destructive.
Jñānaśrībhadra attributes this view to the Śaiva school, gtogs ’dod pa, and Brahmavādins. On the other hand, 
according to Jñānagarbha, this also referred to the Buddhist *Vaibhāṣikas. He probably interpreted this passage this 
way based on the fact that it states, “existences of the past, future, and present existing.” It also appears to be valid 
after looking at the sutra’s 31st paragraph.
 For śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, nirvāṇa is discrimination not functioning due to them seeing objects without 
cognitive distortion by distancing themselves [from the world]4 based on awakening to one’s own characteristics 
and to general characteristics. Based on this, they have the perception that nirvāṇa is there.5
In other words, here a Buddhist view of nirvāṇa is being criticized as heretical.
 From the perspective of this sutra, the correct teaching is that nirvāṇa arises due to a turn (vyāvṛtti)6  of the 
mind, thought, and consciousness[es] ... that is based on svacittadṛśyamātra, or an understanding that everything is 
nothing but what is seen (or is a manifestation) of the mind. A similar teaching can be found in paragraphs 31 and 74.
 I and all Buddhas say, “Nirvāṇa is revolution (parāvṛtti) of the habituated tendencies of the mind and 
consciousness.”7
 I say, “Nirvāṇa is the understanding based on the Tathāgata’s own individual nobleperson wisdom that takes as 
its basis a revolution (parāvṛtti) in the assemblages of the bundle of mind and mind associates that are 
discrimination.8
2) Wisdom for Multicultural Harmonious Co-existence in Paragraph 70
Above, I took up several understandings of nirvāṇa that appear in paragraph 70. Next, I will consider the kind of 
attitude found in the sutra regarding these heretical teachings. First, let me focuse on the fact that śrāvaka and 
pratyekabuddhas’ (i.e., non-Mahāyana Buddhists) views of nirvāṇa are criticised as heretical, at least based on the 
understanding of the commentaries. This criticism suggests that the goal of the sutra here is not eliminating different 
teachings, but rather situating the Mahāyāna’s correct view of nirvāṇa amidst various other ones including those of 
non-Mahāyana Buddhists. When doing so, the sutra says that wise people are to “throw out” (parivarjitāni) and 
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“should avoid” (vyāvartanīyā) heretical teachings.
 Furthermore, in another passage on the heretical Lokāyatika teachings, it says that they “should not be served, 
not be respected, and not be venerated.”9 In another section, the following phrase is found: “In order to throw out 
heretical views...”10
 In the above, an attitude towards heretical teachings can be found that is neither the elimination of, compromise 
with, nor friendly relations with different theories. Rather, it is one of sumiwake (habitat segregation/ lifestyle 
partitioning).
 Incidentally, a similar attitude towards other heretical teachings can also be found in early Buddhism, namely in 
the Suttanipāta’s recommendation to transcend disputes:
 “There is only one truth. There is no second. 
 Those who know it will not quarrel.” (884ab).11
 “I teach that there are only two results of quarrels (i.e., praise and censure). 
 Seeing this reason, you all should see that the state of non-disputes is peaceful, and must not engage in quarrels.” 
(896bcd)12
Furthermore, in the sutras and in Vinayas there is a period in which individuals who used to follow heretical 
teachings were under observance for a four-month period to enter the Buddhist sangha.13
 The Japanese Buddhist Hōnen similarly said, “Various delusions arise where there are quarrels. Wise people 
should leave them 100 yojanas far behind” (諍論之処ニハ諸ノ煩悩起ル、智者ハ之ヲ遠離スルコト百由旬也).14 
While this obviously is a statement that arose in the context of avoiding nenbutsu oppression, it should also be taken 
note of as universal wisdom that can be seen in the aforementioned Suttanipāta.
 Incidentally, in Vasubandhu’s (India, ca. 400) Vyākhyāyukti there is an intense debate surrounding whether the 
Mahāyāna is the teaching of the Buddha. Vasubandhu’s answer to the Śrāvakayāna criticism that Mahāyāna is not the 
Buddha’s words can be found in chapter 4. It is succinctly and accurately summarized in Matsuda [1985]: “Arguing 
against the theory that Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures are not the Buddha’s words, it gives these scriptures value as 
the Buddha’s teachings by sharply distinguishing between explicit and implicit teachings.15 Following the text itself 
more closely, the following could also be said (from Horiuchi [2009: 61-62]): 
a.【Śrāvakas’ Criticism 1】(The symbol “↔” indicates a contradiction)
Āgamas (four Āgamas and five Nikāyas) ↔ Mahāyāna (Here, “Mahāyāna” refers to the 
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　   “teaching that all dharmas are essenceless.”)
《The Mahāyāna contradicts the Āgamas and is therefore not the Buddha’s word》
b.【Vasubandhu’s Refutation 1’】 【Śrāvakas’ Answer 1’】
　　　  Āgamas 　　　　　　 Āgamas
Teaching a ↔ Teaching b　　　　　　　　　　　　⇒ Explicit Teaching≡Implicit Teaching
《If one says Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teachings 
because it contradicts the Āgamas, the Āgamas are not 
either because they have internal contradictions.》
《In the case of contradiction, one is implicit teaching 
and the other is explicit teaching. Therefore, there is no 
contradiction.》
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c.【Śrāvakas’ Criticism 2】 【Vasubandhu’s Answer 2’】
　　　　　　　　　　　Mahāyāna　　　　　　　   ⇒ Mahāyāna
All dharmas are essenceless ↔ Cultivation of the path All dharmas are essenceless (Implicit teachings) ≡
Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra 
[Corresponding verses] (Explicit teachings)
《The Mahāyāna has contradictory teachings, and 
there are no explicit teachings that remove these 
contradictions》
《The teaching that all dharmas are essenceless is an 
implicit teaching, and the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, etc. 
are explicit teachings. In other words, Mahāyāna has 
both implicit and explicit teachings. Therefore, there is 
no contradiction.》
d.【Vasubandhu’s Conclusion】
《It does not hold that “Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s word because it contradicts.” In other words, Mahāyana 
does not contradict and is therefore the Buddha’s word. 》
In summary, Mahāyāna is as it is the Buddha’s word, and Śrāvakayāna is as it is the Buddha’s word. Vasubandhu 
does not hold that the Śrāvakayāna is not the Buddha’s word, nor does he try to dissolve the contradictions between 
the Śrāvakayāna teachings and the Mahāyāna. In other words, even in the case of teachings that appear at first glance 
to be contradictory, since in the Mahāyāna contradictions are dissolved because it contains explicit and implicit 
teachings, “it is not valid to say that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teachings because it contradicts” the Āgamas.
Conclusion
In the above texts, we find wisdom for multicultural and multi-religious harmonious co-existence in the form of “a 
habitat segregation of ideas” that constitutes an ideological version of sumiwake, which Imanishi Kinji 今西錦司 
explains using the example of the upstream / midstream habitat segregation of fish.16 Rather than oppression, 
conquest, or compromise, it is co-existence in which each party maintains their own position while not interfering 
with one another. It emphasizes not the golden rule (doing to others as you would like them to do to you) but the 
silver rule (not doing to others what you would not like to be done to you).
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Notes
1 Based on the paragraph divisions in Kokan Shiren's 虎関師錬 Butsugo Shinron 仏語心論.
2 Yasui [1976: 165-168], Suganuma [1981: 64-73], Tokiwa [2003: 207-211].
3 Below are the papers I have published on “The Basis of Thought for a Society of a Multicultural Harmonious Co-existence”: 
“Upekṣā as a Potential Basis for Kyosei in Buddhism,” Journal of International Philosophy (JIP), No. 1, 2012 (in Japanese 
and English); “An Annotated Translation of Sūtra Passages 62 & 63 in Chapter 2 of the Vyākhyāyukti: ‘Speaking and 
Listening’ as Means towards the Construction of a Basis for Multicultural Coexistence,” JIP, No. 2, 2013 (in Japanese and 
English); “Coexistence in the Early Buddhist Scriptures: From Suttanipāta and Dhammapada” (in Japanese), JIP, No. 3, 
2014. In Horicuhi [2012] I focused on upekṣā (equanimity or impartial mind), one of the four catvāri-apramānāṇi, or 
(immeasurable states of mind; the others being maitrī [friendship], karuṇā [compassion], and muditā [empathetic joy]). 
However, subsequently, I found out that Miyamoto Keiichi had written the following: “Without any qualifications, maitrī, 
karuṇā, and muditā become clingy, and are no different from the mind of attachment. Thus, upekṣā is necessary. At least in 
early Buddhism, the objective of religious training was nihilism toward life, and thus during religious training one must 
cultivate it. Of course, for Gotama Buddha upekṣā was complete; maitrī, karuṇā, and muditā all were magic for living as if a 
world without meaning has meaning—in other words, expedient means” (Miyamoto [1998: 151-152]). My focus on upekṣā 
and sumiwake when searching for the basis of ideas for multicultural harmonious co-existence is essentially rooted in the 
same perspective. However, while Miyamoto writes that upekṣā is “fundamentally adopting an attitude of indifference 
towards self and other” (Miyamoto [1998: 151]), I use it to mean the mind of equanimity towards self and other that leaves 
behind the lenses of interest calculation and self-consciousness, or a transcendental interest. Regardless, further investigation 
into the topic is necessary. 
4 A term that means “to leave behind the noise of the mundane world”. It is used when discussing the religious training and 
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enlightenment of pratyekabuddhas. See the 16th paragraph, etc. (Takasaki [1980: 239]).
5 Nj. 99.14-16: śrāvakapratyekabuddhānāṃ nirvāṇaṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇāvabodhād asaṃsargato viṣayāviparyāsadarśanād 
vikalpo na pravartate/ tatas teṣāṃ tatra nirvāṇabuddhir bhavati/
6 I revised my original translation of vyāvṛtti as “eliminate” based on the guidance of Professor Kubota Chikara 久保田力 
after my presentation at the Japanese Association for Religious Studies' conference held at Doshisha University. Based on the 
below two examples, vyāvṛtti can be understood to mean “turn.” Regarding the Laṅkāvatārasūtra's own view of nirvāṇa, 
also see Kubota [1991].
7 Paragraph 31 (Nj. 98): … -manomanovijñānadṛṣṭivāsanāparāvṛttir nirvāṇam ity ucyate sarvabuddhair mayā ca
8 Paragraph 74 (Nj. 200): vikalpacittacaittakalāpasya parāvṛttipūrvakaṃ tathāgatasvapratyātmāryajñānādhigamaṃ nirvāṇam 
iti vadāmi
9 Paragraph 67 (Nj. 173.3-5): lokāyatiko ... na sevitavyo na bhaktavyo na paryupāsitavyo
10 Paragraph 24 (Nj. 79.8): tīrthakaradṛṣṭivinivṛttyarthaṃ
11 ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutīyam atthi, yasmiṃ pajā no vivade pajānaṃ. This translation follows the Japanese translation in 
Nakamura [1984]. In PTS, the phrase “ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutīyam atthi, yasmiṃ pajāno vivade pajānaṃ” can be found. 
Regarding this passage, Nakamura says to cut it and read as, “yasmiṃ (=sacce) pajā no vivade pajānaṃ (=pajānanto).” The 
above translation follows this suggestion.
12 duve vivādassa phalāni brūmi, etam pi disvā na vivādiyetha khemābhipassaṃ avivādabhūmiṃ.
13 Sasaki [1999: 82-83].
14 Shichi kajō kishō mon 七箇條起請文 [Seven-point Statement] in Shōwa shinshū Hōnen shōnin zenshū 昭和新修　法然上
人全集 [In-Shōwa-New-Revised Complete Works of Hōnen], Ishii Kyōdō 石井教道, ed., Heiraku-ji Shoten, 1955, 
787. Cf. Tannishō 歎異抄 [Lamentations of Divergences] Ch. 12 (Tannishō shinchū 歎異抄新註 [New Commentary on the 
Tannishō], Taya Raishun 多屋頼俊, Hozōkan, 1939).
15 Explicit teachings are those that can be understood literally. Implicit teachings are those that cannot be understood literally.
16 Here, I am just borrowing and modifying a fundamental concept in a search to explore the basis of thought for multicultural 
co-existence. The following criticism of the “sumiwake theory” exists from the field of biology: 
 http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BB%8A%E8%A5%BF%E9%8C%A6%E5%8F%B8 (Wikipedia, accessed 10/25/2014.)
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reference Materials: 
An English translation of the 70th Paragraph of the LAS 
(except the verse portion)1
 [70]
 Then, Mahāmati the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva further said this to the Blessed One (Bhagavat): Blessed one! 
Nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is said [by you]. Of what is this a designation, vis., the word nirvāṇa as imagined by all heretics?
The Blessed One said: Then, Mahāmati, listen well and reflect well. I will tell you. Heretics imagine the nirvāṇa. 
 However, there is no nirvāṇa that suits their imagination (vikalpa, false discrimination).
 Mahāmati, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva gave ear to the Blessed One, saying: Sure, Blessed One.
 The Blessed One said this to him:
 (1) Mahāmati, some heretics explain: there occurs no bundle of mind and mind associates through seeing that 
[everything] differs from permanence (i.e., is impermanent)2, through the aversion to the objects, through the 
destruction of skandha, dhātu, and āyatana. Just like there is a [cessation of] the flame of a lamp, seeds, and fire by 
the cessation of the substratum, there is a cessation of imagination through non-recollection of the object of the past, 
future, and present. For them, therefore, there is a comprehension that there exists nirvāṇa. However, O Mahāmati, 
one does not enter nirvāṇa by the view of destruction.
 (2) Further, the others (heretics) explain that there is liberation (mokṣa)3 by going to another point of place4. Just 
as in cases of the cessation of imagination to the object, [just like] the wind [ceases].
 (3) Further, others explain that there is liberation through destruction of the perception of the comprehended and 
the act of comprehension5.
 (4) Others imagine that there is liberation {through non-occurrence of imagination}6 through seeing permanence 
and impermanence7.
1 Text: T MS, 50a3-51a4., Nj.182.7-185.16, Hadano etc. 1993.420-435; Commentaries: Jg, D 213b1-217b2, Jś, D 210a5-
218a1; Translations: Suzuki [1932(1999): 157-160], Yasui [1976: 165-168], Suganuma [1981: 64-73].
2 Nj has -vaidharmā- and footnotes that Tib has -vaidharmya-. However, since the latter reading is also attested by the T MS, I 
will take this reading.
3 This whole paragraph criticizes the heretical view of nirvāṇa. But (2) to (4) refer to mokṣa (liberation) instead of nirvāṇa.
4 Jś comments that this is the assumption, such as going to liberation at the middle of the sun.
5 buddhiboddhavya: This refers to subject and object according to Jś. Its destruction seems to accord with the proper 
Mahāyāna view of nirvāṇa. However, he further says: they (i.e., heretics) maintain that the permanent ātman is liberated 
because such manifestations (i.e., those of the subject and object) do not exist. Commentators mostly detect the view of 
ātman on the basis of the heretical view of nirvāṇa as enumerated here. However, it is only in (7) that the sutra itself clarifies 
this point. See Nakamura［1950: 227ff.］.
6 vikalpasya apravṛtter: Suganuma rightly points out that since the Song translation. omits these words in {}, this is “assumed 
not to have existed originally.”
7 Jś writes, “by attributing the consciousness that abides in the stream of continuity of personality as ātman…" This is also 
denied because it admits ātman. Jg says that it is to see that some things such as ātman are permanent, while others such as 
matter (rūpa) are impermanent. He identifies this view as that of Vedānta.
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 (5) Further, others8, thinking that9 “the imagination of various signs10 brings11 the arousal of sufferings”- not 
being skillful in [the fact] that [everything is] nothing but what is seen by the mind (svacittadṛśyamātra), being afraid 
of the fearing of signs - comprehends nirvāṇa by seeing the no-signs12, with the sign of13 being eager for happiness.
 (6) Further, others imagine nirvāṇa by the realization of its own, and the general characteristics of all things, by 
the [real] existence of things of the past, future, and present as un-destructive.
 (7) Further, others imagine nirvāṇa by the non-destruction of the ātman, being, soul, personality, man, person14, 
and all things.
 (8) Further, O Mahāmati, other heretics who have foolish understandings imagine nirvāṇa through seeing the 
discrimination of prakṛti (i.e., material principle) and puruṣa (i.e., mental principle), and by the fact that guṇa15 is a 
creator of transformation.
 (9) Others [imagine nirvāṇa] by the complete extinction of merit and demerit.
 (10) Others [imagine nirvāṇa] through the extinction of defilement and through gnosis.16
 (11) Others imagine nirvāṇa through seeing the Supreme God as the independent creator of the world.
 (12) Others [think] that the arising of this world is due to the mutual dependence, not to the cause. However, it is 
nothing but an adherence to the cause17. But because of their foolishness, they do not realize it. By this they imagine 
nirvāṇa.
 Others say that the birth of this world occurs from interaction, not from a cause. However, this is (sa ca) nothing 
8 This refers to the vidyādharāntavādins according to Jś.
9 Although Nj has only iti without the footnote of variant readings, the T MS has iti kṛtvā. I will amend Nj according to the T 
MS.
10 This refers to the representation (*saṃjñā) according to Jś.
11 Although Nj has -vāhaka without the footnote of variant readings, the T MS has –āvāhaka, which appears again in Nj. 197.2 
(Tib: ’thob par byed pa). I will amend Nj according to the T MS (Cf. BHSD, 108a).
12 Nj has nimitta- and this is also supported by Tib. However, all the Chinese translations have 無相, which supports *animitta-. 
Even if we take the reading of Nj, since the previous word is nimittabhayabhītā, if we connect these directly and assume 
nimittabhayabhītānimitta-, this corresponds to the Chinese translations. However, according to Hadano, etc., manuscripts 
have nimittabhayabhītāḥ, namely, have ḥ at the end of the word. But since in the previous sentence it reads “being afraid of 
the fear of signs,” the phrase “to see the no-sign (animitta)” is expected from a contextual point of view, too. In addition, Jś 
comments that “the sign” refers to “the sign of representation” and says: “by thinking that representation is a swelling, 
representation is a pain, one becomes the non-possessor of such representations. ”
13 Nj has -nimitto and footnotes that Tib has -nimitte. However, since the latter reading is also supported by the T MS, I will 
amend Nj. Suganuma and Takasaki also understand the way according to the Tib. As a whole, the meaning seems to be: 
seeing the no-sign being afraid of the sign itself has the sign of being eager for happiness. Jś comments, “where there is an 
aspiration for happiness, there is a basis of samsara. How can [it] be nirvāṇa? (gang na bde ba’i kun tu tshor ba yod pa de na 
skye ba gzhan gyi gnas te/ ji ltar mya ngan las ’das pa yin).”
14 These are synonyms for ātman (self).
15 This refers to the three guṇas: sattva, rajas, and tamas.
16 This also seems to be the proper view of nirvāṇa, as that of the Buddhist, or at least that of the śravakas. However, Jś 
comments that it is not liberation, because they lack investigation by wisdom, and because even if defilements such as lust 
are gone, they still adhere to ātman.
17 Nj has anye anyonyapravṛtto ’yaṃ sambhavo jagata iti na kāraṇataḥ sa ca kāraṇābhiniveśa eva na cāvabudhyante mohāt 
tadanavabodhān nirvāṇaṃ kalpayanti. However, according to T MS and Tib (<<>> means that it is a supplement from the 
Tib), anye anyonyapravṛtto <’>yaṃ sambhavo jagata | na kāraṇataḥ <<iti>> sa ca kāraṇābhiniveśa eva na cāvabudhyante 
mohāt tadanavabodhān nirvāṇaṃ kalpayanti. Namely, according to the T MS, iti does not exist after jagata. Moreover, 
according to the Tib, iti exists after kāraṇataḥ. Although previous translations followed Nj and understood that this whole 
sentence (two sentences in English) describes a heretical view of nirvāṇa, if we follow the T MS and Tib, we can understand 
that the phrase after sa ca is a criticism of the heretical view of nirvāṇa by the Buddha.
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but adherence to a cause. Without understanding this because of their ignorance, they imagine nirvāṇa.
 (13) Further, O Mahāmati, other heretics18 imagine nirvāṇa by understanding the truth and the way (the way of 
truth)19.
 (14) Others have the comprehension of nirvāṇa through the realization20 of the guṇa (quality) and guṇin (possessor 
of the quality)21, which is caused by seeing that [these are] one, other, both, and non-both.
 (15) Others imagine nirvāṇa by seeing what arose from the nature, namely, the nature of things that is like the 
variety of the [feather of the] peacock, various mines of jewels, and sharp spine. 
 (16) Others, O Mahāmati, through the realization of the twenty-five truths.
 (17) Others imagine nirvāṇa by understanding the teaching of the six subdivisions [of actions] by the protector 
of creatures (i.e., the king).
 (18) Others see that time is the creator and that the arising of the world depends on time. By this realization, they 
imagine nirvāṇa.
 (19) Others by existence.
 (20) Others by non-existence22.
 (21) Others by the comprehension of existence and non-existence.
 (22) Others imagine nirvāṇa by seeing the non-discrimination between existence (i.e., saṃsāra) and nirvāṇa.
 Further23, O Mahāmati, others who roar the lion’s roar imagine nirvāṇa as follows: by the realization that 
[everything is] nothing but what is seen by the mind, by non-adherence to the existence and non-existence of the 
outer [objects], by seeing the real state that is void of what relates to the four alternatives (cātuṣkoṭika), by the non-
falling of the imagination, which is seen by the mind in two extremes [i.e., of existence and non-existence], by the 
non-apprehension of object and subject, by seeing that all measures do not work to the truth24 – by being foolish, 
there exists the non-apprehension of truth – by which [i.e., of foolishness] elimination, by the realization of the holy 
dharma that [should be understood] personally, by the recognition of two forms of selflessness, by the cessation of 
two defilements, by the reversion of mind, mentation, and mental consciousness, [which occurs] when [one enters] 
the concentration (samādhi), which has an image such as that of illusion25, going higher and higher through the 
stages [of the bodhisattvas] until reaching the stage of Tathāgatahood.
18 This refers to the Naiyāikas according to Jś.
19 satyamārga: Jg expounds a twofold interpretation of this compound. The first is “the truth and the way,” which refers to the 
four truths and the way[s] for them. Thus, this refers to the Buddhist view. The second is “the way of truth,” which refers to 
the sixteen padārthas (categories) by Naiyāyikas.
20 Nj and Chinese translations have abhisaṃbaddhād (by connection) unanimously. However, Tib suggests abhisaṃbuddhād (by 
realization). According to Jś, if one radically destroys the nine qualities (buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, 
dharma, adharma, and saṃskāra) of the ātman, it is the ātman that has qualities liberates. The liberation for Vaiśeṣikas is that 
the ātman is independent by being void of qualities. Therefore, here, I would like to follow Tib, realizing [the difference of] 
qualities and what possesses qualities.
21 This refers to the Vaiśeṣika according to the commentaries. It establishes the nine factors as dravya (substance, that which has 
quality), and twenty-four factors as guṇa (quality).
22 By ablution and burnt offering (*homa) according to Jś.
23 The order of this and the next paragraph differs in the Song translation. As Takasaki points out, the order of the Song 
translation has contextual consistency. Suzuki also translates according to the order of the Song translation.
24 sarvapramāṇāgrahaṇāpravṛttidarśanāt tattvasya: As Suganuma points out, the reading of this phrase differs among 
translations. Here, since the Song translation has 一切度量不見所, namely, it omits agrahaṇa, I would like to delete the 
word, as it did not originally exist but was incorporated by mistake, since it appears immediately after.
25 Although Nj has māyādiviśvasamādhi without the footnote of variant readings, according to Hadano etc., some manuscripts 
have māyādibimbasamādhi, which is supported by Tib. I would like to accept the latter reading here. Jś says, “the
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 Thus, what is wrongly told by the argumentative heretics is connected with improperness and should be avoided 
by the wise. O Mahāmati, all these imagine nirvāṇa by the personal continuity that falls into the two extremes [of 
existence and non-existence]. However, nothing arises nor ceases here. O Mahāmati, nirvāṇa for each heretic, which 
is examined through their own texts, thought, and understanding, deviates [from the truth]. It is not established as 
being imagined by them26. There is no nirvāṇa for any [heretics] through the coming and going of mentation.
 O Mahāmati, by you and other Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, this should be learned and the view of nirvāṇa by all 
heretics should be rejected.
 concentration (*samādhi) has a pure and mundane appearance, such as illusion and reflection (rgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan la 
sogs pa bzhin du dag pa jig rten pa’i snang ba dang bcas pa’i ting nge ’dzin).” Māyopamasamādhi is often emphasized in 
this sutra (Cf. paragraphs 3, 7 etc. of the LAS).
26 Nj has tathā na tiṣṭhate without the footnote of variant readings, and T MS has na tathāvatiṣṭhate, which should be taken up.
